Human and animal moral enhancement

A few days ago I was sent a link to this fascinating talk on human moral enhancement featuring John Harris and Julian Savulescu. The debate concerns whether we should enhance the capacity of humans to make moral decisions, i.e., whether we should make people more moral, using technology, if we can. I was asked if I would spread the word about the talk, and I’m going to do that both because it’s an interesting debate between two interesting philosophers, and because it touches on issues that I’ve found interesting to think about in my own research. So, here’s the link: http://iai.tv/video/enhancing-morality

I wrote above that the talk touches on question of interest to me, which might puzzle some readers given that my area of research focuses on non-moral beings.[1] Significant parts of the argument for granting greater moral consideration to non-human animals rely upon drawing analogies between humans lacking moral agency and non-human animals. At the same time, there are arguments that we should make humans lacking autonomy into autonomous beings if we can. Thus, you see arguments from J.S. Mill that we should provide education to children in order to improve their rational capacities. More interestingly (to me anyway), you see claims in the literature on political theory and disability rights that we have duties to distribute resources to enable cognitively impaired humans to become more autonomous.[2] If we are to do this, then one question that arises is: do we do so because humans cannot function as equals in society without autonomy, or do we do it because autonomy is an objective good. If autonomy is an objective good, then is it only an objective good for humans? If we answered that last question in the negative, then we might find ourselves wondering if we might, in some circumstances, have duties to make moral beings of non-human animals. Thus, the arguments for the moral enhancement of humans addressed by Harris and Savulescu might also be applicable to non-humans too. One place to begin answering these sorts of  questions is with Sarah Chan’s paper on the subject: ‘Should we enhance animals’. I think these are fascinating questions – I hope that maybe you do too now.

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[1] I refer to non-human animals as non-moral beings (moral patients) for simplicity – in fact, I think there’s a good argument to be made that some non-human animals, such as dolphins and chimps, might well possess some degree of moral agency (much as I think my children do).

[2] See, for example, Sophia Isako Wong, “Duties of Justice to Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities,” Metaphilosophy 40, no. 3-4 (2009): 383.

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Collective responsibility for harming animals.

Tomorrow, I’m responding to a paper at a conference of the idea of secular evil jointly organised by the Manchester Centre for Political Theory and Manchester Centre for Emotion and Value. The paper I’m responding to, by Newport’s Gideon Calder, is fascinating stuff, and is particularly concerned with how we explain and describe collective atrocities.

Back when I was beginning my thesis, I did some work on the concept of cruelty and I spent a little time wondering whether those who eat meat are culpable for the cruelty of the meat industry, or if it’s some other wrong that’s done. Connected with this, I considered the duties and culpability of ordinary citizens in a democratic society which doesn’t merely condone, but actively supports, both emotionally and with huge quantities of public money, unimaginable levels of cruelty to animals. My response to Gideon’s paper has got me thinking about this issue again, and I wonder once more if members of our society are individually or collectively responsible for the evil that is done to non-human animals.

Like Rawls, I’m inclined to the view that says we have natural duties of justice, not just to avoid injustice, but also to prevent injustice, and to act so as to bring about more just states of affairs. If we do have these duties, and if you accept my claim that the way we treat animals is unjust (I’m going to leave that undefended), then most people in liberal democracies are responsible for acts that is so harmful that I have no hesitation in calling them evil (my post here should help illustrate my feelings on the matter). That means not only that otherwise decent people are responsible for evil, but additionally, those individuals who merely seek to avoid harm (such as vegans) are failing in their duties to prevent evil or make society more just. There are reasons to think that most of us are not really culpable or blameworthy for causing the harm – but I think I don’t think any of the reasons I’ve seen succeed (John Hadley has a couple of papers offering reasons, but I won’t lay out why I think his arguments fail here). However, my response to Calder’s paper on evil drew my attention to the thought that individuals might be excused for inaction in putative cases of collective responsibility if a) they can only prevent harm by acting together, and b) there is no co-ordinating institution that enables joint action. This is an interesting thought, and it’s one I’m keen to come back to after the conference is over.

I’m sure there are masses of problems with excusing people on the grounds above, but the general point is that it’s sometimes surprising what relevance one can get out of a conference that ostensibly unconnected with one’s own field. Go to more conferences!